Supplying War - Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton by Martin Van Creveld is a fascinating read. it examines battles and campaigns that most history buffs will know, but from angles that are not often considered. To understand war, you must understand logistics and Van Creveld's work is a compelling look into how military logistics has developed since the early 17th century, including in some of the most important theatres of World War II.
The Review.
"An army marches on its stomach". So goes the well known Napoleonic dictum. But until very recently, the forward progression of an army was far more dependent on the stomachs of the horses, whose daily feed allowance by weight was 8-10 times what a soldier needed. In fact, some 980,000 pounds of food per day was required to feed both the cavalry and their horses during Louis XIV's wars - of which only 120,000 pounds was for the men.
Such detailed calculations provide insight into why wars unfold as they do and therefore, why history unfolds as it does. For example, though Napoleon has often been criticised for using heavy carts in his Russian campaign - they sank in the mud, making them difficult to move - light carts would have required far more horses and therefore, more feed than the countryside on the path to his eastern advance would probably have been able to supply.
This is an example of the many calculated decisions made in war that Martin van Creveld covers, in depth, in his book. One recurring theme is the need for balance between requisition (An innocuous word for armies stealing from the inhabitants of the land through which they march) and dependence on established supply lines (Which extend from some sort of forward base or magazine). As it turns out, using supply lines that stretch far back to a home operating base is a very modern concept. Even though Napoleon further developed the rudimentary magazine system established by Louvois (One of Louis XIV's generals), it didn't come close to supplying all the food required by his Grande Armee. In 1805, for example, Napoleon had to change the course of his offensive because his generals weren't able to secure enough hard biscuits in the town at which his army was set to rendezvous. Logistics, therefore, dictated strategy!
Even during World War I, armies still needed to feed off the land. In Germany's march on France in 1914, the updated version of the Schlieffen Plan required that the western wing of the advance move quickly, given that it had more ground to cover relative to the eastern most wing. In addition, there was a limited number of roads that could be used to supply the army - which forced supply units to traverse the same roads used for the offensive and led to traffic jams and delays. These factors led the 1st Army, especially its 3rd and 4th Reserve Corps, to move forward quickly and prevented the supply line from reaching the army. Indeed, the delays were so substantial that the heavy columns would not reach the remainder of the fighting force until after their retreat from the Battle of the Marne. The Germans were, even in the days of modern industrial war, forced to live off the land!
Reviewed by Brigadier Kuldip Singh, a dear friend and course mate.
Tailpiece.
1. It was a thoroughly wet day. Have asked a supplier, suggested by my doc, to get me a 'Glucometer' so that one can monitor one's sugar levels. But my heart sank when I came to know that pricks were necessary to draw the blood sample. What a blow?
2. Anitha and Captain Premkumar dropped by in the morning. Anitha is Lekha's college mate while Prem was with me in C-LABS. It was nice catching up with them.
The Review.
"An army marches on its stomach". So goes the well known Napoleonic dictum. But until very recently, the forward progression of an army was far more dependent on the stomachs of the horses, whose daily feed allowance by weight was 8-10 times what a soldier needed. In fact, some 980,000 pounds of food per day was required to feed both the cavalry and their horses during Louis XIV's wars - of which only 120,000 pounds was for the men.
Such detailed calculations provide insight into why wars unfold as they do and therefore, why history unfolds as it does. For example, though Napoleon has often been criticised for using heavy carts in his Russian campaign - they sank in the mud, making them difficult to move - light carts would have required far more horses and therefore, more feed than the countryside on the path to his eastern advance would probably have been able to supply.
This is an example of the many calculated decisions made in war that Martin van Creveld covers, in depth, in his book. One recurring theme is the need for balance between requisition (An innocuous word for armies stealing from the inhabitants of the land through which they march) and dependence on established supply lines (Which extend from some sort of forward base or magazine). As it turns out, using supply lines that stretch far back to a home operating base is a very modern concept. Even though Napoleon further developed the rudimentary magazine system established by Louvois (One of Louis XIV's generals), it didn't come close to supplying all the food required by his Grande Armee. In 1805, for example, Napoleon had to change the course of his offensive because his generals weren't able to secure enough hard biscuits in the town at which his army was set to rendezvous. Logistics, therefore, dictated strategy!
Even during World War I, armies still needed to feed off the land. In Germany's march on France in 1914, the updated version of the Schlieffen Plan required that the western wing of the advance move quickly, given that it had more ground to cover relative to the eastern most wing. In addition, there was a limited number of roads that could be used to supply the army - which forced supply units to traverse the same roads used for the offensive and led to traffic jams and delays. These factors led the 1st Army, especially its 3rd and 4th Reserve Corps, to move forward quickly and prevented the supply line from reaching the army. Indeed, the delays were so substantial that the heavy columns would not reach the remainder of the fighting force until after their retreat from the Battle of the Marne. The Germans were, even in the days of modern industrial war, forced to live off the land!
Reviewed by Brigadier Kuldip Singh, a dear friend and course mate.
Tailpiece.
1. It was a thoroughly wet day. Have asked a supplier, suggested by my doc, to get me a 'Glucometer' so that one can monitor one's sugar levels. But my heart sank when I came to know that pricks were necessary to draw the blood sample. What a blow?
2. Anitha and Captain Premkumar dropped by in the morning. Anitha is Lekha's college mate while Prem was with me in C-LABS. It was nice catching up with them.
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