This superb tome on the Korean War, brings out many impressions, particularly about how the inevitability of miscalculation complicates geopolitical forecasting(to say nothing of the task of fighting a war). If anything, he understates the complications posed by the human element.
At least in Halberstam's narrative, the problems in Korea were not just the result of the harsh conditions, political realities and imperfect intelligence inherent to any conflict. These kinds of challenges are always difficult to navigate amid the fog of war, of course, but they become more manageable with a nimble command structure.
But the Korean conflict went south for the Americans after they raced north of the 38th parallel, at least to Halberstam, as a direct result of the culture of arrogance, sycophancy and blind ambition cultivated by General Douglas Mac Arthur. It would have been one thing to predict that China would not enter the war while still preparing for the reasonable possibility that it would and then proceeding with appropriate caution. It was, however, reckless to race to the Yalu river, violating sacred military doctrine by splitting forces and ignoring ample evidence that the People's Liberation Army was already lying in wait!
Hindsight is 20/20, but there were plenty of US officials who knew that the US forces were marching into an ambush. Mac Arthur's utter disregard for the risk undermined the intelligence cycle and got a lot of Americans killed. This isn't a challenge to the rational actor theory.
Mac Arthur and Ned Almond, the commander of the X Corps, had rational goals. Those goals just didn't neatly line up with the goals of winning a war, much less winning it efficiently. One of the more dismaying aspects of Halberstam's story is that so many of the same themes resurface in the American wars that followed, starting with Vietnam. Perhaps, the main lesson is that the lessons of history are only learned sometimes and in this line of work, dissonance is a factor that cannot be ignored.
Reviewed by Brigadier Kuldeep Singh, a course mate and a friend.
Tailpiece.
Went through the monthly blood sugar tests. Need to improve further!
At least in Halberstam's narrative, the problems in Korea were not just the result of the harsh conditions, political realities and imperfect intelligence inherent to any conflict. These kinds of challenges are always difficult to navigate amid the fog of war, of course, but they become more manageable with a nimble command structure.
But the Korean conflict went south for the Americans after they raced north of the 38th parallel, at least to Halberstam, as a direct result of the culture of arrogance, sycophancy and blind ambition cultivated by General Douglas Mac Arthur. It would have been one thing to predict that China would not enter the war while still preparing for the reasonable possibility that it would and then proceeding with appropriate caution. It was, however, reckless to race to the Yalu river, violating sacred military doctrine by splitting forces and ignoring ample evidence that the People's Liberation Army was already lying in wait!
Hindsight is 20/20, but there were plenty of US officials who knew that the US forces were marching into an ambush. Mac Arthur's utter disregard for the risk undermined the intelligence cycle and got a lot of Americans killed. This isn't a challenge to the rational actor theory.
Mac Arthur and Ned Almond, the commander of the X Corps, had rational goals. Those goals just didn't neatly line up with the goals of winning a war, much less winning it efficiently. One of the more dismaying aspects of Halberstam's story is that so many of the same themes resurface in the American wars that followed, starting with Vietnam. Perhaps, the main lesson is that the lessons of history are only learned sometimes and in this line of work, dissonance is a factor that cannot be ignored.
Reviewed by Brigadier Kuldeep Singh, a course mate and a friend.
Tailpiece.
Went through the monthly blood sugar tests. Need to improve further!
No comments:
Post a Comment